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Abstract
The European sovereign debt crisis is characterized by the simultaneous surge in bor-
rowing costs in the GIPS countries after 2008. We present a theory, which can account for
the behavior of sovereign bond spreads in Southern Europe between 1998 and 2012. Our
key theoretical argument is related to the bail-out guarantee provided by a monetary union,
which endogenously varies with the number of member countries in sovereign debt trouble.
We incorporate this theoretical foundation in an otherwise standard small open economy
DSGE model and explain (i) the convergence of interest rates on sovereign bonds following
the European monetary integration in late 1990s, and (ii) - following the heightened default
risk of Greece - the sudden surge in interest rates in countries with relatively sound economic
and financial fundamentals. We calibrate the model to match the behavior of the Portuguese
economy over the period of 1998 to 2012.
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1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is characterized by the simultaneous surge in
borrowing costs in Southern Europe after 2008. As we document in figure 1, at the dawn
of the crisis in late 2008 the spread on Greek government bonds (relative to German bonds)
rose from 50 basis points (bps) to 200 bps within a couple of months, and further increased
to 1000bps by 2012. Shortly after the outbreak of the Greek debt trouble, the bond spreads
started to rise in Portugal, Italy and Spain as well (Fig.1). As we also present in figure 1,
by the time the European Monetary Union was first established back in late 1990s, these
Southern European countries experienced a convergence in their government bond spreads
vis-à-vis Germany an empirical pattern, which is almost the mirror image of the diverging
spreads between 2008 and 2012.
In this paper, we present a theory, which can account for the behavior of sovereign
bond spreads in Southern European countries between 1998 and 2012. Our key theoretical
argument is related to the bail-out guarantee - and its limitations - provided by a monetary
union. We incorporate this theoretical foundation in an otherwise standard small open
economy DSGE model and explain (i) the convergence of interest rates on sovereign bonds
following the European monetary integration in late 1990s, and (ii) - following the heightened
default risk of Greece - the sudden surge in interest rates in countries with relatively sound
economic and financial fundamentals, Portugal in particular.
In our theoretical setting, we explicitly model the endogenous bail-out decision of the
European Monetary Union (EMU). We assume that for EMU the cost of bailing out a
country is taking over a fraction of the debt burden of that particular country. To the end
of benefits of bailing out, we first assume that a country who defaults on its sovereign debt
can no longer remain in the monetary union.1 Building upon this assumption, we introduce
an explicit value function for the union, which measures by how much the monetary union
values each country’s membership. This value function exhibits a local increasing returns to
scale property such that the marginal loss associated with letting a country leave the union
is the highest if that particular country is the first one to leave. This mechanism reflects
the credibility loss associated with the first-exit. Specifically, the union desires to stay as a
whole with all of its union members. Once the first country is gone, letting a second country
default and leave the union is not that costly anymore.
Our theoretical mechanism implies endogenous bail-out guarantees for members of the
1This assumption is based on the observation of the Eurozone Crisis, where the countries were bailed out
to prevent them from exiting the union. Although this motivation is of political nature, one could think of
economic reasons why a defaulting government that is being cut off from financial markets needs the power
to print its own currency to finance its spending.
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currency union. A bail-out guarantee for a risky country reduces the interest rates on its
sovereign debt, since investors expect their losses to be partially covered by the bail-out funds
of the monetary union. The situation changes for an untroubled - yet risky - country, such
as Portugal, after a troubled union member (Greece) ends up at the door of the currency
union for an actual bail-out. From this moment on, any additional bail-out decision will need
to be considered simultaneously with the first one. Because of the particular shape of the
currency union value function the maximum debt level that can be supported for untroubled
countries suddenly contracts - leading to the contagion of sovereign debt default risk to those
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Figure 1: Spreads on government bonds of GIPS (relative to German bonds). Monthly data
on long-term yields, obtained from Eurostat.
We introduce this theoretical mechanism into a small open economy DSGE model to-
gether with two additional features. The first one is the explicit modeling of sovereign default
as a random event, as proposed by Bi (2012), and Bi and Traum (2012), where a govern-
ment is assumed to default whenever its debt level exceeds its fiscal limit - a random variable
drawn from a known distribution. This simplification allows us to highlight the macroeco-
nomic implications of the contagion mechanism for an untroubled but risky country in the
monetary union.2
Second, we incorporate a sovereign risk channel that transmits the movement in sovereign
2This approach deviates from the traditional line of literature started by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
where default is a strategic decision.
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interest rates into domestic private interest rates. This assumption has been utilized for
the context of the euro area crisis by Corsetti et al. (2014), and also more broadly when
studying sovereign defaults in emerging markets by Mendoza and Yue (2012). The sovereign
risk channel allows us to analyze the implications of the monetary union membership on
the real economy. In particular we capture an initial prolonged period of low interest rates,
which leads to high output levels and debt accumulation. Once a union member is troubled,
the sudden surge in borrowing costs, caused by contagion, triggers a recession and may lead
to a sovereign debt crisis.
We calibrate the small open economy model to match the key moments that we observe
for Portugal over the period of 1998 to 2012. Portugal is particularly interesting for our
analysis because it illustrates well the idea of a relatively sound country pushed to the edge
of a sovereign debt crisis by contagion. Although it went through a period of slow growth
prior to the crisis, its sovereign debt as a share of GDP was at the average euro area level,
and the 2008-9 GDP contraction it experienced was milder than in most of the EMU. It
seems that the Portuguese debt problems started with the surge of borrowing costs and the
repeated downgrading by the main rating agencies that followed in 2010.3
We investigate the macroeconomic implications of two exogenous shocks: the introduction
of the euro and the Greek crisis. Despite the relative simplicity of the framework, the model
performs quite well in replicating the behavior of key macroeconomic variables, such as
interest rates, GDP and unemployment.
The results from our theoretical as well as quantitative analysis advocate for strict coor-
dination of fiscal policies within currency unions. It shows that a no bail-out policy within
a monetary union cannot be credible and, hence, needs to be replaced by a more credible
set-up.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. Recent empirical studies discuss the
spread puzzle in the euro area sovereign bond markets. Bernoth et al. (2012), Aizenman et al.
(2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) and Ghosh et al. (2013) using either yield spreads or
CDS spreads document that sovereign interest rates were mostly insensitive to fiscal variables
prior to the crisis, and that this changed drastically during the crisis. Moreover, Mink and
de Haan (2013) and Ludwig (2014) find empirical evidence for contagion in sovereign debt
markets within the EMU. Our paper complements the empirical literature on the spread
puzzle by providing a theoretical framework.
Our work is also related to theories which aim to investigate the euro area crisis. Broner
3An interesting example of an opposite situation is Belgium, which had much higher debt levels, similar
output performance and a series of political crises, which resulted in 535 days without a government in
2010-11, but experienced no sovereign debt crisis in this period. We come back to the case of Belgium in
our discussion in section 5.
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et al. (2014) build a small open economy model with creditor discrimination to explain the
rapid increase in the share of sovereign bonds held by domestic investors in the southern euro
area countries. Aguiar et al. (2013) and Corsetti and Dedola (2013) show how a credible
central bank may prevent a self-fulfilling sovereign debt crisis in a stand-alone country and
argue that this ability is lost within a monetary union. Corsetti et al. (2014) investigate in
a two-region monetary union how high debt levels in one of the regions may lead to a self-
fulfilling sovereign debt crisis in the whole union. Beetsma and Mavromatis (2014) consider
different forms of debt mutualisation in a monetary union. Finally, the decision of a potential
euro area break-up is considered by Alvarez and Dixit (2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic mechanism
of our theory. Section 3 outlines the small open economy model, which we use to consider
the dynamic implications of the monetary union and regimes. Section 4 is devoted to the
quantitative analysis of our model calibrated to the Portuguese economy. Section 5 considers
potential extensions of the theory and its policy implications. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Basic mechanism
Let us consider a government of a country within a monetary union. Every period it issues
some amount of one-period bonds, Bt. Those bonds pay a net return r
G
t and are traded on
international markets. We assume that the international investors are risk neutral, which
implies that the required expected return on government bonds has to equal the risk-free
rate on world markets, r∗, which can be expressed in a no arbitrage condition:
1 + r∗ = (1− p(Bt)) (1 + rGt ) + p(Bt)(1− θ)(1 + rGt ), (1)
where p(Bt) is the probability of default, and θ is the expected loss in the case of default,
which - as will be explained in the next subsection - depends on the prevailing regime.
Following Bi (2012) and Bi and Traum (2012), default is defined here as a situation in
which the debt level exceeds the fiscal limit, Bt > B
∗
t+1. Since the fiscal limit is a stochastic
variable with a known distribution, the probability of default is defined as p(Bt) = P (Bt >
B∗t+1).
2.1 Monetary union and regimes
As already mentioned, the loss to the investors in case of default, θ, depends on the
prevailing regime, or stated differently, on the institutional arrangements. For a country, for
whom there is no one to step in to provide financial support, θ = θ̄ > 0. The scenario with
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no external support during troubled times will be referred to as the stand-alone regime. A
country within a monetary union, on the other hand, may be bailed out by other member
countries in the case of default, which would mean that the investors bear no losses, i.e.
θ = 0.4 Such a bail-out may be explicit in the form of an international treaty, or implicit.
An implicit guarantee results from the fact that investors anticipate that other countries in
the union will support the troubled country to keep it within the monetary union.5 In this
paper, we concentrate on implicit bail-out guarantees. We call the scenario with ex-ante
bail-out expectations as the cooperative regime.
The decision of the other countries whether to bail out a troubled member of the monetary
union is modeled as a comparison of the costs of the bail-out and the benefits of keeping the
country within the union. We assume that a defaulting country has to leave the monetary
union, unless it is bailed out. The other countries in the union attach some value M to the
monetary union, which depends on the number of countries that remain within the union, k
M(k) =
{
m0 +m1k if k = N
m1k if k < N.
, (2)
where m0,m1 > 0 are parameters, and N is the total number of countries within the union.
This simple specification assumes that the countries attach some constant value to keeping
each member within the union, m1, but they also attach some value to keeping all countries
within the union. This local increasing returns to scale feature reflects the idea that the first
country leaving a monetary union would prove that this may indeed happen and, hence,
undermine the credibility of the whole union.6 We refer to this as the first-exit effect.
The cost of a bail-out equals to the expected losses that need to be financed because
of the bail-out, i.e. θ̄(1 + rG,ht )Bt. In normal times the probability of multiple countries
running into debt trouble at the same time is very low, implying, the bail-out decision to be
considered separately for each member of the union. This means that the bail-out condition
boils down to
θ̄(1 + rG,ht )Bt < M(N)−M(N − 1) = m0 +m1. (3)
It is important, however, to keep in mind that the interest rate depends on the regime.
4One could imagine a bail-out with partial losses to investors. Nevertheless, to keep the model simple
we will assume that θ = 0 whenever there is a bail-out.
5For a discussion of implicit bail-out guarantees in the context of the East Asian crisis see e.g. Corsetti
et al. (1999).
6The linear functional form is used only for simplicity. In fact, all the result in this section hold for any
M(k) that exhibits local increasing returns to scale, such that the marginal loss associated with the first-exit
is the highest, or stated differently, the results hold for any M(k) that satisfies ∀N>k>1M(N)−M(N − 1) >
M(k)−M(k − 1).
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Therefore, the conditions for the prevailing regime can be stated as
Regime =

Cooperative, if Bt < B,
Multiple equilibria, if B ≤ Bt < B̄,
Stand-alone, if B̄ ≤ Bt,
(4)
where B is the level of debt, which solves (3) with equality under the stand-alone regime, and
B̄ is the solution to the same under the cooperative regime. Due to the effect the regimes









Figure 2: Determination of the prevailing regime. Bail-out costs (BO) are weighed against
the cost of the country exiting the union (m0 +m1).
The above condition states that if the expected bail-out costs are lower than the maximum
bail-out size, m0+m1, then the other countries are expected to intervene and the cooperative
regime prevails. If, on the other hand, even the costs under the cooperative regime exceed
the maximum bail-out, then investors expect no intervention, hence, the stand-alone regime
prevails. Finally, if the result of a comparison of the expected costs and benefits of a bail-
out depends on the prevailing regime then both regimes are self-fulfilling equilibria. Stated
differently, in this case, if the investors expect one of the regimes to prevail they will charge
the appropriate interest rate. If the government happens to default then the costs of a
bail-out depend on the previously chosen interest rate. This implies that there will be no
bail-out if investors expected the stand-alone regime to prevail, and charged a higher interest
rate. On the other hand, the country will be supported if investors expected the cooperative
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regime to prevail and, hence, charged lower interest rates.
This analysis is also presented in a graphical form in figure 2. The two curves named
BOSA and BOCO represent the expected bail-out costs under the stand-alone and the co-
operative regime, respectively. The points where they cross the horizontal line representing
the maximum bail-out, m0 +m1, determine the threshold debt levels, B and B̄, respectively.
Those points divide the horizontal axis into three areas, with different regimes prevailing, as
discussed.
2.2 Contagion
The bail-out decision looks different when one of the countries within the union undergo-
ing debt trouble is already receiving financial aid. Then, any other contemporaneous bail-out




θ̄(1 + rGt,j)Bt,j < M(N)−M(N − J) = m0 + Jm1, (5)
where J is the number of countries in need of a bail-out, and the subscript j denotes j-th
country variables. In general, whenever some of the J countries may need a bail-out higher
than their marginal value to the union, m1, the maximal bail-out available to the remaining
countries is lower than the one in equation (3). This shift in the maximum available bail-out
may lead to a situation in which some countries exceed the debt threshold B̄ and, hence,
switch from the cooperative to the stand-alone regime.7
This situation is presented in figure 3. In this scenario, the country has a debt level Bt,
which is lower than B if the maximum bail-out is m0 + m1. This means that the country
operates under the cooperative regime. The situation changes, however, once the maximum
bail-out falls from m0 +m1 to a new, lower level (somewhere between m0 +m1 and m1). The
country debt level does not change, but the debt thresholds do, and it leads to the situation
where Bt > B̄
′. Hence, the country switches to the stand-alone regime and its borrowing
costs surge, potentially leading to a higher accumulation of debt. This may turn an initially
fiscally sound country into a highly troubled economy.
The risk of a regime switch depends on the initial sovereign debt level of a given country.
7This analysis looks only at the expected costs of a bail-out, hence, a regime switch does not mean that









Figure 3: Contagion mechanism within a monetary union. A shift in the maximum available
bail-out (from m + m0 to a new, lower level) leads to a switch from the cooperative to the
stand-alone regime.
In general, whenever the debt level satisfies
m1
θ̄(1 + rGt )
< Bt <
m0 +m1
θ̄(1 + rGt )
this country may experience a regime switch caused by the sovereign-debt contagion. That
risk depends on the fiscal position of the remaining countries in the union and their proba-
bility of a debt crisis.
Applying this mechanism to the situation in the European Monetary Union, one could
expect two regime switches. The first one taking place around 1999 when the monetary union
came into life and the creditors could expect the repayment of sovereign debts of every euro
country to be guaranteed by the whole union. This would be a switch from the stand-alone
to the cooperative regime.
The next switch might have taken place during the global financial crisis. The first
country hit by the crisis was Greece, and the countries of the euro area were quick to react.
But the amount of financial support granted to Greece might have been higher than the
marginal value of keeping Greece within the monetary union, here m1. If that was the case,
then the maximum support the next troubled country, which requires a bail-out simultaneous
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to the Greek bail-out, would expect was going to be lower than in normal times, i.e. lower
than m0 + m1. This would naturally shift down the maximum debt level supporting the
cooperative regime, B. In the case of countries with even moderately high debt levels, this
could translate into a switch from the cooperative to the stand-alone regime, causing the
sudden rise in borrowing costs as observed in peripheral Europe.
3 The DSGE model
To investigate the dynamic properties of the described mechanism and the potential con-
sequences of regime switches it is necessary to incorporate it into a fully specified macroe-
conomic model. For this purpose we will consider a standard small open economy model,
similar to the ones presented by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), and Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). The model is kept as simple as possible, except for three main innovations introduced
to the basic framework. They are meant to modify the model to allow the analysis of the
situation of a small country joining a monetary union. Two of those extensions have been
already discussed in the previous section.
The first innovation is the way we approach government debt by explicitly modeling
default risk as the probability that the debt level exceeds the fiscal limit. An approach that
was first introduced by Bi (2012) and Bi and Traum (2012).
The second innovation is the introduction of the bail-out decision by the remaining mem-
bers of the monetary union.The member countries decide about their financial support by
comparing the costs of a bail-out with the costs of an exit from the monetary union of the
defaulting country. This decision, in turn, affects the losses that international investors have
to bear on sovereign bonds. The described mechanism leads to the emergence of two regimes.
Under the cooperative regime the country is expected to be bailed out by its partners when-
ever needed. Under the stand-alone regime, on the other hand, the country is not expected
to be bailed out.
Finally, the last innovation is to assume that the country specific risk-free interest rate,
which serves as the benchmark for determining the interest rate offered to households and
firms, is equal to the interest rate on sovereign bonds. This allows the private interest rates
to react to regime switches and is conceptually related to two alternative assumptions made
in the literature on sovereign default. According to the first one, used by Mendoza and Yue
(2012), private credit repayments might be partially diverted in case of sovereign default.
The second one, made by Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014), introduces a ’sovereign risk channel’,
which makes private risk premia dependent on domestic sovereign risk. Both assumptions
imply that private interest rates partially follow the dynamics of the interest rates faced by
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the government. Corsetti et al. (2013) provide evidence that this effect was economically
significant in the euro area countries during the recent crisis.
3.1 Households
Consider a small open economy populated by an infinite number of identical households,





where lt denotes hours worked, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and U is the period utility
function of the form U(c, l) = 1
1−σ [c− χl
υ]1−σ , and υ > 1, ψ > 0.
Households own all the physical capital in the economy, kt, which evolves according to
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it, (7)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital, and it denotes investment in future
capital.
The agents in this model face also a sequence of period budget constraints given by
bt = (1 + r
H
t−1)bt−1 + ct + it + Φ(kt+1 − kt) + Ψ(bt)− wtlt − utkt + Tt −Gt, (8)
where bt is the household’s net debt position at the end of period t, r
H
t is the interest rate
on household debt, Φ(·) are capital adjustment costs, Ψ(·) are portfolio adjustment costs,
wtlt represents labor income, utkt income from the rental of physical capital, and Tt and
Gt denote a lump-sum tax and a lump-sum transfer from the government, respectively.
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Capital adjustment costs take the functional form Φ(x) = (φ/2)x2, where φ > 0, while
portfolio adjustment costs are assumed to be equal Ψ(x) = (ψ/2)(x− b̄)2, where ψ > 0 and
b̄ is a constant parameter.9
We introduce the sovereign risk channel in the simplest possible way by assuming that
the interest rate faced by households, rHt equals the interest rate on sovereign bonds r
G
t .
8All variables in this model are real and expressed in terms of consumption units and prices are assumed
to be constant and equal to the overall price level in the monetary union. This simple approach follows from
the assumption of purchasing power parity and a common currency in the whole monetary union. Price and
inflation level differences within the EMU are a well known fact and have been reported by i.a. Turunen
et al. (2011) and Estrada et al. (2013). The analysis of this issue is intentionally left for future research.
9Portfolio adjustment costs, also known as debt holding costs, are needed to guarantee the stability of
the model. For alternative ways of closing a SOE model see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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The problem of the household, hence, can be represented as maximizing (6) subject to
(7) and (8). The first order conditions associated with this problem are





= 1 + κ(bt − b̄), (9)
Ul(ct, lt) = −wtUc(ct, lt), (10)
(1 + rHt ) [1 + EtΦ′(kt+1 − kt)] = EtF ′k(kt+1, lt+1) + 1− δ + EtΦ′(kt+2 − kt+1), (11)
where the first is the intertemporal Euler equation associated with the debt/savings decision,
the second one determines labor supply, and the third one is the Euler equation for capital.
3.2 Firms
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment. They rent capital and hire la-
bor from households to produce the homogeneous good using a Cobb-Douglas production
function
F (k, l) = Akαl1−α. (12)
Due to a friction in the labor market firms need to borrow the funds necessary to pay the
wage bill at the beginning of the period (working capital constraint). This means that the
profits earned by firms can be written as
Π(k, l) = F (k, l)− uk − (1 + rH)wl. (13)






u = Fk(k, l). (15)
Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one the profits are always equal zero.
3.3 Government
The government finances its spending, Gt through taxes on households, Tt and debt, Bt.
The budget constraint of the government takes the form
Gt + (1 + r
G
t−1)Bt−1 = Bt + Tt. (16)
12












where both parameters τY and τB are positive, and Ȳ , B̄ are steady state values of output
and debt, respectively. This form of reaction function indicates that tax revenues increase
with the improvement in economic activity, as well as with rising debt. Additionally, τB is
assumed to be large enough to prevent debt from exploding. At the same time we assume
government spending to be constant over time, Gt = Ḡ.
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Finally, following Bi (2012) and Bi and Traum (2012), we specify the cumulative density




1 + exp(η1 + η2Bt)
, (18)
where η1 and η2 are time-invariant parameters dictating the shape of the distribution.
4 Quantitative analysis
Since the presented model has no analytical solution, in this section we turn to describing
its quantitative properties. We first calibrate the model to match the Portuguese economy
and then consider a scenario with two regime switches, i.e. a switch from a stand-alone to
the cooperative regime at the time of the introduction of the euro, and then a switch to the
opposite direction by the time the global crisis hit Europe and Greece got into debt trouble.
Next, we compare those results with the actual dynamics of macroeconomic variables within
this period, in order to assess whether our model can capture some of the developments
observed in the economies of peripheral EMU countries.
For the simulations of the model we use the perfect foresight approach with the exception
that the regime switches are unexpected.11 In practice, this translates into calculating two
transition paths between two different steady states. First, the economy is assumed to be in
the stand-alone steady state directly before the introduction of the euro, and that is also the
starting point for the transition path to the cooperative regime. The second regime switch
takes place ten years after the first switch, and there is no anticipation of the switch. This
10Since neither taxes, nor government spending are distortive in this model, the role of taxes and govern-
ment spending is limited to the role played by the primary surplus. Therefore, the assumption of constant
government spending and reactive tax revenues is not restrictive as it is equivalent to any other combination
of the two that yields the same behavior of the primary surplus.
11An exception from the perfect foresight approach is also made for the fiscal limit, hence, also for the
default decision. In the considered scenarios a sovereign default is always considered ex ante as possible, but
it never occurs.
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means that the second transition path is simply calculated as a separate perfect foresight
path starting at the eleventh year of the previous transition path and converging to the
stand-alone steady state.
Assuming that the regime switches are unexpected is an obvious simplification. The first
switch has been, of course, anticipated, so one could assume that all the results around this
period should have been smoother. The assumption is definitely more plausible in the case
of the second regime switch as the Greek sovereign debt crisis was indeed unexpected. First
of all, investors and policymakers failed to realize how the financial crisis is going to spread.
The picture of the Greek fiscal situation was additionally blurred by manipulations in official
statistical reports.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the Portuguese economy, with one period being set to one
year.12 All the parameter values are presented in table 1. The long-run tax rate, τY , is
set equal to the average ratio of tax revenue to GDP in Portugal in the years 1997-2008.
The parameter ρτ is set to 0.25 to reflect the low variability of tax revenues in the pre-crisis
period. The level of government expenditure, G, is chosen so that in the steady state the
primary surplus of the government allows to cover the interest payments on debt, with a
steady state level of debt equal to 65% of GDP. This debt level reflects the average for the
period 1997-2008.
Table 1: Parametrization of the model
Households Government
Discount factor β = 0.95 Steady state tax rate τY = 0.40
Utility curvature σ = 5.00 Sensitivity of taxes to output ρτ = 0.25
Labor curvature υ = 1.60 Long-run government spending G = 0.36
Relative weight of labor χ = 2.48 Expected losses on bonds θ = 0.10
Depreciation rate of capital δ = 0.10 Fiscal limit distribution η1 = −11
Capital adjustment costs φ = 8.00 η2 = 11
Portfolio adjustment costs ψ = 0.50 World risk-free interest rate r∗ = 0.05
Firms
Technology parameter A = 1.67 Effective capital share α = 0.33
Since there are no cases of default of developed countries in the modern history, the
parameters of the fiscal limit distribution, η’s, and the expected losses in case of default
12The most popular alternative would be to set one period to a quarter. We have chosen one year because
data on the government sector are usually reported on an annual basis. Another argument for this choice is
the medium term focus of this paper, as compared to traditional business cycle DSGE models.
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have to be based on data for emerging countries and the current risk evaluation in the euro
area. Therefore, we assume θ = 0.1 following the calculations of Bi (2012) for the effective
losses on bonds of emerging market countries in case of default. Having set this coefficient,
we calibrate the parameters of the fiscal limit distribution to follow the actual relationship
between Portuguese debt levels and the spread between Portuguese and German sovereign
bond interest rates during the debt crisis. The obtained parameters, η1 = −11 and η2 = 11,
are smaller but close to the values obtained for Italy and Greece by Bi and Traum (2012)
with Bayesian estimation methods. Finally, the risk-free interest rate was chosen close to
the average interest rate on German sovereign bonds, i.e. r∗ = 5.3%.
The parameters governing the household’s problem are mostly chosen based on values
traditionally used in macroeconomic studies. This way, the discount factor, β = 0.95, and
the depreciation rate of capital, δ = 0.1, are annual equivalents of the commonly used values
of 0.98-0.99 and 0.025, respectively, used in macroeconomic models calibrated for quarterly
data. The parameters of the relative utility weight of labor, and of labor curvature are taken
from Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
The portfolio adjustment costs parameter, ψ, was chosen to obtain the dynamics of capital
flows similar to what is observed in the southern euro area countries. The same approach
was taken for the capital adjustment parameter, φ, whereas it is interesting to mention that
the model was rather insensitive to any changes to φ, as long as it stayed positive.
The last two parameters define the production function. The effective share of capital, α,
is chosen to equal one third, following most macroeconomic models, and is consistent with
data for Portugal. The technology parameter, A, is set to 1.67 as a normalization of the
steady-state production level to unity.
4.2 EMU and the two regime switches
In this section, we consider the dynamic effects of the two regime switches, with a tran-
sition from the stand-alone to the cooperative regime at the time of the euro introduction,
and from the cooperative regime to the stand-alone regime as an aftermath of contagion
following the Greek sovereign debt crisis. To make the exercise closer to the events in the
EMU, government expenditure dynamics in the first years after the second switch follow the
actual dynamics in the GIPS countries. This means an increase in government spending of
ten percentage points in the first three years of the crisis, and then a gradual introduction
of austerity measures.13
13Here, austerity is meant only in terms of spending cuts and/or tax increases, without any impact on the
national economy, except for the indirect effect going through interest rates. This allows me to refrain from
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Figure 4: Effects of the introduction of the euro and contagion from the Greek crisis modeled
as regime switches from the stand-alone to the cooperative and from the cooperative to
the stand-alone regime, respectively. Data were obtained from the Eurostat and OECD
databases.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of the model’s variables when the economy transits to a
steady state with zero spreads, and their reaction to the reemergence of spreads. The first
drop in interest rates is relatively low. This results from the fact that the spread in the model
reflects only default risk, whereas the pre-EMU spreads were largely driven by exchange rate
reader may refer to i.a. Mendoza et al. (2014), Corsetti et al. (2013), and the discussion in Corsetti (2012).
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risk in high inflation countries.14
What is more important, the model captures well the surge in borrowing costs from 2009
to 2012, i.e. up to the time of the statement made by the ECB president Mario Draghi on
July 26, 2012 that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, which
pushed the sovereign interest rates of the GIPS countries down. In terms of our model,
we could think of the statement as increasing the credibility parameter, m0, and pushing
Portugal into a regime that is a hybrid of the two discussed regimes.
The model predicts also the positive effect of the euro introduction on output and em-
ployment, even though it underestimates it. This might be due to the simplicity of the used
model and lack of any channel for the positive trade effects of exchange rate risk elimination.
Nevertheless, the model captures very well the recession triggered by Greek contagion. It
accounts for both the deepness and long duration of the economic downturn. According to
the model predictions a recovery will be only gradual and will reach a lower steady state
level.
It is also illustrative to consider that in order to keep the model stable, it is necessary to
assume a quick debt reduction, which is here equivalent to a high value of τB. Any scenar-
ios without substantial debt repayments returned explosive debt paths and ever-shrinking
economies.
5 Policy implications and extensions
The presented results seem to mirror the general pattern observed in the euro area,
which was the main purpose of this paper. Therefore, they allow to understand at least
partially the puzzling behavior of the interest rates on sovereign bonds of those countries as
compared to those of Germany and other AAA core euro area countries. The model was kept
simple intentionally, to allow a transparent presentation of the novel ideas and any future
policy applications of the model will inevitably require several extensions of the theoretical
framework.
If the model is to provide reliable quantitative predictions, a distinction between tradable
and non-tradable goods is necessary. The inclusion of non-tradable goods would also allow
to distinguish between domestic and union wide price levels, capturing another important
dimension of the EMU problems. This might also allow the model to shed some light on the
current account imbalances within the euro area, which are an important dimension of the
crisis and were mostly neglected so far.
14This has been also argued by i.a. Kan (1998) and Bassetto (2006).
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Also the government sector and the regime switch mechanism could be extended. One
possibility to do so is by endogenizing the fiscal limit distribution. So far it has been assumed
to be exogenous. This assumption is not too restrictive, since the distribution depends on
the long-term ability of the government to repay its debt, which is only to a limited extent
influenced by short term developments. Nevertheless, a prolonged recession could have an
impact on the primary surplus that lasts for several years. This extension would require the
introduction of distortionary taxes to calculate Laffer curves, as has been done in Bi (2012),
as well as a more micro based approach to government spending.
Another improvement of the model would be a more sophisticated mechanism for regime
switches and a more dynamic treatment of bail-outs. Whereas now we consider two exoge-
nous regime switches, one could imagine a third, endogenous switch, back to the cooperative
regime. This might happen at the time the country reduces its debt sufficiently.
The presented model is relatively simple since it is meant to serve rather as a framework
for explaining and understanding the mechanisms within a monetary union. Nevertheless,
as long as the limitations of the model are kept in mind, some general policy implications
may be drawn based on this model.
First of all, the model shows how strongly interconnected are countries within a monetary
union. The discussed contagion mechanism relies on the fact that fiscal problems in one of
the countries within the union may spread to others through a regime switch, which triggers
a surge in interest rates. This means that national fiscal policy has international effects and
should, hence, be subject to international regulation. The idea is not completely new, as it
has been already implemented in the EMU in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact.
This suggests that the failure of the pact may be one of the main sources of the current
crisis. This also means that a more robust mechanism is needed to avoid a repeat of the
recent events.
Another institutional problem of the European Monetary Union highlighted by the model,
is the existence of implicit bail-out guarantees. Despite the explicit no bail-out clause in-
cluded in the Maastricht Treaty, the governments of Greece, as well as Ireland, Portugal,
and Cyprus, received support from the other euro area countries. This proves that the no
bail-out clause was unreliable from the beginning of the EMU, and markets behaved rational
to perceive it as such. To solve this problem the euro area governments need to choose an
institutional framework that is reliable. The creation of an explicit institution responsible
for inter-governmental support, such as the European Stability Mechanism, is a move in the
right direction but it does not solve the issue. The problem of the ESM is the limited funding
it can manage. The current fund would not be sufficient to save one of the larger countries,
as e.g. Italy or Spain. The crucial question is what would the other euro area countries do
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if one of the large countries needed support. The EMU will be prone to confidence drops
triggering regime switches as long as the bail-out policy is not made clear and transparent,
and countries do not take its limitations into account while setting their fiscal policy.
A related implication is also the economic importance of statements made by political
leaders. Since in reality the values of m0 and m1 are not publicly known, any statement
made by a policymaker about granting support, may influence the public perception of
those values and shift the regimes. In fact, it might be argued that the ECB president Mario
Draghi used exactly this power on July 26, 2012, when he made the pledge that ”the ECB
is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” Therefore, negative statements made
by other European leaders may have the opposite effect and contribute to the international
debt problems.
This model might also offer a framework for explaining why the contagion effect was
limited to peripheral countries and did not affect highly indebted core countries, as e.g.
Belgium. This might not have been an effect of the core countries’ higher fiscal reliability,
but rather of their economic and political value, significantly higher than in the case of the
other EMU members. Going back to the example of Belgium, its location in the center
of the euro area, with a number of key EU institutions in Brussels, and sharing its official
languages with two other core countries, makes it a vital member of the monetary union.
One could expect, therefore, that other countries will be ready to save it at a much higher
cost than e.g. Portugal. And this would mean that m1 has a different value for different
countries, making them more or less prone to regime switches.
6 Conclusions
The behavior of sovereign interest rates in the EMU countries is one of the new puzzles
in international macroeconomics, with a large body of empirical literature documenting
the insensitivity of governments borrowing costs to fiscal variables prior to the European
debt crisis, as well as studies investigating contagion effects from Greece to other Southern
European countries. The theory presented in this paper provides a possible explanation for
the spread puzzle. It allows to understand the convergence of the interest rates on government
bonds as the effect of implicit bail-out guarantees within a monetary union. At the same
time, the reemergence of spreads in the aftermath of the Greek crisis is captured within our
model as a second switch. Contagion in this model is equivalent to the switch from the
cooperative to the stand-alone regime, which happens when potential bail-out decisions are
taken for several countries at the same time and the threat of the credibility loss connected
to the first-exit is weighted against the size of those multiple bail-outs.
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We incorporate the optimal bail-out framework into a small open economy model to
consider the dynamic effects of regime switches. The model is calibrated to key features of
the Portuguese economy. Without introducing any further shocks, we show how the first
regime triggers a modest expansion in economic activity, while the Greek contagion and the
second regime switch cause a prolonged and deep recession. Despite the simple structure of
the considered model, we are able to replicate the actual dynamics of GDP and employment
in Portugal.
The results of our analysis are a strong argument in favor of fiscal coordination within
a monetary union, as the fate of the union members is strictly interconnected and initially
sound countries may be dragged down by contagion. On the basis of our model we also
argue for a more transparent and explicit mechanism for inter-governmental support, as the
no bail-out clause turned out to be not credible and creates more space for uncertainty about
the sustainability of sovereign debt.
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